lundi 31 mai 2010

A new stage in the crisis of capitalism - Part One



After talk of the so called "credit crunch" gave way to optimistic comments about the "green shoots" in the economy, events in Greece caught the bourgeois commentators unaware. Now the world economy has once again been plunged into chaos and uncertainty as the governments of Europe try to contain the fall-out from the near-default of Greece and it is the workers who will be presented with the bill.

“To the toiling masses of Europe it is becoming ever clearer that the bourgeoisie is incapable of solving the basic problems of restoring Europe’s economic life.” (Trotsky, On the United states of Europe, 1923)

The stock markets of the world are in turmoil. The falls on the stock exchanges are a warning that the economic revival is in danger. The extreme volatility of the market over the past fortnight reflects a fundamental lack of confidence. All the lights are now flashing red.

The immediate cause of the panic is the crisis of the euro. This is ironic. Not long ago they were talking about the euro as a rival to the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency. Now the convulsions of the euro are driving the world's stock markets down and raising fears that the world is about to fall back into slump.

The once prosperous euro zone is now teetering on the edge of a terminal crisis. The markets believe that the weaker euro zone countries will not be able to take the necessary action to reduce their deficits. The fears over the Greek debt problems have rapidly turned into fears over Portugal and Spain. Only by injecting huge funds from an emergency fund can the European bourgeoisie shore up the shaky edifice.

The global financial crisis of 2008 was related to sub-prime mortgages, but now the crisis is related to what one might call sub-prime government debt. In the past, the bonds of European countries were considered to carry virtually zero risk. But now sovereign default in one of the world's core economic areas has become a serious threat. The Economist put it like this: 2008 will be remembered as the year when the banks defaulted; 2010 will be remembered as the year when governments defaulted.

Europe’s troubles can lead to a general crisis of world capitalism. On Monday May 24, Washington Post carried a very interesting headline: “One false move in Europe could set off global chain reaction”. That adequately sums up the situation. The situation is so fragile that any small incident: a missed budget projection by the Spanish government, the failure of Greece to hit a deficit-reduction target, a drop in Ireland's economic output – could set off a chain reaction that could lead to a global slump.

The conclusion of the article is striking: “the future of the U.S. economic recovery in the hands of politicians in an assortment of European capitals”. This is most revealing. It shows the extremely fragile and unstable nature of the economic recovery, which finds its reflection in the extreme nervousness of global markets. Almost anything can cause a sudden collapse of “confidence”. Credit markets worldwide could suffer gridlock, throwing the world economy back into recession. The euro crisis is only the tip of a very large iceberg, and as with a real iceberg, the part you see is frightening enough, but the hidden part is what is really deadly.

In a distorted way, the nervousness of the markets is a reflection of the growing awareness of the bourgeois that the economic crisis will lead to a sharp revival of the class struggle everywhere. The question is simply stated: will governments be able to force the workers to accept huge cuts in the public sector budgets in the interests of saving capitalism? The spectacle of workers taking to the streets in Greece, Portugal and Spain has already given them an answer that they did not want to hear.

The crisis in Greece is only the accident through which necessity reveals itself. In Greece, the chain of European capitalism has broken at its weakest link. But there are several other very weak links. Even if they find a temporary solution to the problems of Greece, the fear that the contagion will spread to Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy. And Britain, though not part of the Euro Zone, will not be far behind.

Effects of globalization

At bottom the crisis is a manifestation of the fact that the productive forces on a world scale are coming into contradiction with the narrow limits of private ownership and the nation state. Like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, the bourgeoisie has conjured up forces it cannot control.

In a sense, the bourgeoisie is the victim of its success. The capitalists attempted to overcome the limitations of the nation state by increased exploitation of the world market. After the collapse of the USSR, two billion people joined the capitalist world market. The entry of China, Russia, Eastern Europe, and the increased participation of India, provided them with vast new sources of markets, investments and raw materials.

However, dialectically, everything is turning into its opposite. The process has reached its limit. Globalization now manifests itself as a global crisis of capitalism. The factors that previously served to push the world economy up are now combining to push it onto a vicious downward spiral. We saw something similar in 1997 and 1998 when the East Asian financial crisis spread rapidly through Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and other nations. Now Europe is facing the same prospect.

It may be argued that Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland represent only about four percent of world economic activity. But once the dominoes start to fall, the effect can pass rapidly from Greece to Portugal and Spain, then to Ireland and Italy, then Britain. Confidence in the euro would collapse, causing chaos in world money markets that would end in a new crisis in Wall Street. In the words of Cornell University economist Eswar Prasad: "the debt crisis and its ripple effects are bad news for all corners of the world".

The Washington Post continues:

“Inside the euro zone, banks are intimately linked, with a web of investments and cross-country bond holdings that could be a main vector for financial ‘contagion,’ with a default in one country weakening banks elsewhere.”

Europe in crisis

Drawing by Latuff.Drawing by Latuff.The crisis is pushing Europe, and its nation states, into dangerous and uncharted waters. There were growing fears about the exposure of banks to European governments and private borrowers. If nothing was done, European governments would have been faced by the same fate that was suffered by Lehman Brothers. Greece could be on an inexorable path towards default.

By May 7th, yields on the weaker euro-area countries’ government bonds rose sharply, as the markets showed their muscle. There is a real threat that foreign financing for these countries would cease altogether. The bond markets’ nervousness indicates that the investors are quite prepared to see whole nation states go under. They are firm believers on the old Chinese proverb: “What do you do when you see a man falling? – Give him a shove!”

It is true that all euro-area countries have an interest in avoiding a default. If Greece goes under, the markets’ attention would immediately pounce on Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy. Confidence in the euro would plunge. Yet the German bourgeois do not like the idea of paying the debts of “profligate” countries.

On May 2nd euro-zone governments and the IMF set out the terms of a €110 billion ($145 billion) rescue for Greece. That was far more than had previously been promised but it was not enough to settle investors’ nerves. Stockmarkets in Europe and America slumped on May 4th and fell again the next day. Greek bonds continued to trade at the level of junk bonds.

Caught on the horns of a dilemma, the European bourgeoisie did not know what to do. The policymakers have been accused of doing too little, too late. But in reality, whatever they did would be wrong. In the end Germany and the European Union were forced to act to save the euro zone. In the early hours of May 10th finance ministers, meeting in Brussels, agreed on an emergency plan to prop up the euro zone. The main element is a “stabilization fund”, worth up to €500 billion ($635 billion). Of this, €60 billion is to be financed by the sale of EU bonds.

The fund is to be supplemented by up to €250 billion more from the IMF. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) said it would purchase government bonds to restore calm to “dysfunctional” markets. It will offer banks unlimited loans at a fixed interest rate. Yet again the governments are handing out billions to the banks to prevent a collapse. But in the first place, there is no guarantee that there will not be such a collapse, and in the second, who will pay the bill for these huge sums?

The financial markets’ initial reaction was naturally euphoric. How could the sharks not be euphoric at the prospect of further billions of taxpayers’ money being shoveled down their greedy gullets? Germany’s stock market closed more than 5% higher on May 10th. France’s main index went up by almost 10%: big French banks are heavily exposed to Greece, so they also stand to benefit handsomely.

However, this euphoria soon gave way to a more somber view. The market knows that the whole thing has been hastily cobbled together, and there is no guarantee that it will work for long. The package, despite its impressive scale, only buys time for Greece and other vulnerable troubled governments to cut their budget deficits and to improve their lost export competitiveness. If that is not done, there will be an even worse crisis in the euro zone in a few months.

National conflicts

A strained relationship. Photo by the office fo the  Prime Minister of Greece.A strained relationship. Photo by the office fo the Prime Minister of Greece.The appearance of European unity was in reality an illusion. Behind the façade of unity and solidarity, all the nation states jealously guarded control over their national interests and their national banking systems. These divisions have been cruelly exposed by the present crisis.

The parsimonious spirit that lies behind all the talk of an “international rescue” is shown by the long delays in approving the plan, which even then was further delayed by failure to agree on details such as the interest rate to be charged for access to funds. And immediately after the deal was signed, the conflicts between the national governments began.

Germany is insisting that the money will be raised and controlled by governments, not bureaucrats in Brussels. They do not want huge amounts of money being handed out without close monitoring. In other words, the money will be given to Greece with the strictest monitoring and control. Britain said it will not sign up to it.

Jean-Claude Trichet, the central bank’s president, was accused of “caving in to political pressure to help out spendthrift governments”. Axel Weber, the head of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, who may succeed Mr Trichet when he steps down next year, openly criticized the ECB’s conduct in the pages of Börsen-Zeitung, a German financial newspaper. In his defence, M. Trichet maintains that the central bank was “fiercely and totally independent”, a statement that not many people believe these days.

A speech made by Merkel during a rowdy session of the German federal parliament made matters worse. She said that "the current crisis facing the euro is the biggest test Europe has faced in decades," and: “If the euro fails, then Europe fails". The already panicky markets plunged again.

Germany took a unilateral decision to ban the short selling of EU government debt and banks. The move was taken because of the German Chancellor's increasing desperation ahead of last Friday's vote on the euro bailout. The opposition MPs and increasingly her own coalition members are becoming increasingly angry. Merkel had to do something to prove that Germany was not simply writing a multi-billion euro cheque from the taxpayer to bail out Greece and others. She was trying to show that Germany was taking steps to defend itself.

This was no more than a mild attempt to control speculation. It has no chance of success. But the markets want complete freedom to pursue their predatory activities. The move wiped billions of euros off the value of shares and drove the single currency down to a four year low. It infuriated Germany's European partners, who had not been consulted. There were unprecedented public recriminations from Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister. There were naturally loud protests from London (both Labour and Tories were agreed), reflecting the completely parasitic character of British capitalism's reliance on finance capital.

Hypocrisy of German capitalists

The underlying sickness of European capitalism is reflected by the feverish movements of the stock exchanges. The financial world is being shaken by rumors of the possible collapse of the euro zone. All the official denials have not helped to calm the jittery nerves the markets. In this mood of panic, the bourgeois seek to find someone to blame. The Germans blame the Greeks. The Greeks blame the speculators. The French blame the Germans.

Increasingly, the finger is being pointed at Berlin. Germany, which was the engine of growth for the whole EU, its banker and de facto leader, is now the target of all the pent-up anger and frustration of its partners. Why are the Germans so stingy? Why did Merkel not do more to help Greece earlier? At a recent meeting of European leaders it is said that President Sarkozy threatened to leave the euro zone if Berlin did not help Greece

The criticisms of her neighbours do not go down well in with Berlin. The prostitute press in Germany and other countries are trying to portray the situation as “Europe helping lazy Greek workers.” That is a lie. This crisis was not brought about by the workers of Greece or any other country. It was created by the voracious and reckless actions of the bankers and capitalists of both Greece and the rest of Europe. And the present “rescue plan” is a plan to rescue, not Greek workers, but the bankers of Germany, France and other countries who own most of the debts of Greek capitalism.

The public displays of moral outrage in Germany reek of hypocrisy. German capitalism benefited more than any other from the introduction of the Euro. The German capitalists enjoyed a privileged position in the years of boom. Their exports invaded every market, taking advantage of the fact that weaker economies like Greece, Spain and Portugal, could no longer devalue the currency to protect their national market. German banks were happy to make profits out of lending to Greece, Spain and Eastern Europe. They made a lot of money then, but they are not prepared to accept losses now.

Germany’s dilemma

The problem is that, in the end, somebody has to pay the bills. Merkel managed to push through the euro zone-wide bail-out mechanism on May 21. But opposition among German voters is growing and it is spreading to Merkel’s coalition partners and political allies. “Once again, we’re Europe’s fools” was how Bild, the influential German newspaper, greeted news of the euro rescue plan. In the latest polls, 47 percent of Germans are in favor of returning to the deutschmark. In a crucial state-level election May 9 Merkel’s governing coalition was heavily defeated. This is a sign of mounting dissatisfaction with her Christian Democratic Union and its coalition ally, the Free Democratic Party.

The weaker members of the rich man’s club, known as the “Club Med” economies, currently have a 3 trillion euro mountain of debt and their ability to service it is in doubt. The “markets” are nervous about this. That is to say, the bankers are nervous, because they fear that they may not get their pound of flesh. That means, in the first place, the German bankers. Exposure of German banks to Club Med debt may be as much as 500 billion euros. Thus, despite all the huffing and puffing in Berlin, what is being discussed here is not aid to Greece, but aid to the German bankers and their European partners in crime.

From the point of view of German capitalism it was a case of “damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.” If they provided Greece (and other weak euro zone economies) with money, they would have trouble at home, and anyway there is no guarantee it will succeed. If they refused, a Greek default would have a domino effect throughout Europe and on a world scale, which would pull Germany down with everyone else. Therefore, Merkel was forced to swallow hard and approve a huge bailout.

At some point, Germany may conclude that further bailouts are just throwing money into a bottomless pit. At that point, Germany may decide to cut its losses. Germany may decide that the ECB should ignore its rules and purchase the debt of the weak euro zone governments by the simple device of printing money (“quantitative easing”). The euro zone, including Germany, would be paying for it this with the weakening of the euro and higher inflation.

The Germans complain a lot, but they overlook the fact that the euro zone provided Germany with considerable economic benefits. Since the euro was adopted, unit labor costs in Club Med have increased relative to Germany’s by approximately 25 percent, further improving Germany’s competitive advantage. Its neighbors are unable to undercut German exports with currency depreciation, and German exports have benefited. The result has been a massive €110 billion (2007) current account surplus for Germany towards the rest of the Euro-zone. That means that Germany exports €110 billion more to the Euro-zone than it imports, which is paid for by massive lending from German banks. For German capitalists this was of tremendous benefit in the short-run but in the long-run it is completely unsustainable.

In order to revive the deutschmark, Germany would have to reinstate the Bundesbank, withdraw its reserves from the ECB, print its own currency and then re-denominate the country’s assets and liabilities in deutschmarks. This would be difficult, but not impossible. The other members of the euro zone would face far greater difficulties if they wished to return to their old currencies.

However, since German banks own much of the debt issued by Club Med, the losses caused to Germany by a break with the euro zone would be far greater than remaining within the euro zone and financially supporting it, at least for the time being.

Greece – the sick man of Europe

Greece joined the Euro in 2001. At that time German capitalism was puffed up with its own importance following reunification. The moving of its political centre to Berlin in the heart of Europe symbolized its unlimited ambition to become the Master of Europe. Under these conditions the Imperial Master graciously accepted the accession of Greece as a further step towards consolidation of German domination of the Balkans, which began with the German-inspired intrigue to break up Yugoslavia.

However, Greek capitalism is the weakest of several weak links in European capitalism. The Greek bourgeoisie – one of the most corrupt and reactionary in Europe – thought that it was being very clever when it joined the European rich man’s club. Like the frog in Aesop’s fable, it blew itself up to an enormous size, and then it exploded.

Even in 2001, the real weakness of Greek capitalism ought to have been clear to a blind man. It was graphically expressed in the huge deficits in the current account, budget and public debt. As long as the boom continued, Karamanlis could comfortably maintain himself in power for four-and-a-half years. He easily won two elections. The Greek economy appeared to be healthy, with growth averaging over 4% a year up to 2007.

The tourists were streaming in, construction was booming as a result of the 2004 Olympics. Greek ship-owners were making record profits from China’s export boom; Russian oligarchs were buying expensive land on Aegean Islands. There were subsidies from the European Union. Last but not least, Greek membership of the Euro seemed a guarantee of future prosperity.

But the global economic crisis cruelly exposed the underlying weakness of Greek capitalism. As a direct result of the adoption of the euro, the Greek economy has lost competitiveness. Many Greeks are underemployed. This affects the youth in particular, with a sharp rise in youth unemployment and a reduction of openings in education. The unemployment rate for young graduates in Greece is 21%, compared with 8% for the population as a whole.

The growing mood of discontent that was seething beneath the surface was shown by the violent youth protests after Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old schoolboy, was shot dead by a policeman in December 2008. The murder triggered five nights of riots. The protests quickly spilled into the main streets of Athens, and thence across the country. There were violent clashes with riot police and tear-gas filled Syntagma Square. Groups of youths burned cars, broke shop windows decorated for Christmas and tossed in petrol bombs.

These demonstrations were on an unprecedented scale, resembling an uprising of the youth. Demonstrators attacked police stations and public offices in a dozen cities, causing damage estimated at more than €100m ($130m). Hundreds of school students battled with police after the teenager’s funeral. Others threw stones at policemen on guard outside parliament, shouting “let parliament burn”. This was already a warning to the ruling class. It showed the pent-up anger of Greece’s youth, which was only an extreme expression of a general discontent in Greek society.

Throughout history, every revolution has been anticipated by a movement of the youth – particularly the students, who are a sensitive barometer that reflects the buildup of contradictions and tensions in society. This was the case in Russia in 1901 and in Spain in 1930. In both cases, the demonstrations of the student youth were a warning of the revolutions of 1905 and 1931.

Kostas Karamanlis. Photo by  New Democracy.Kostas Karamanlis. Photo by New Democracy.The protests caused paralysis of the authorities. The right wing government of Costas Karamanlis, terrified of provoking an even bigger movement, was unable to impose a curfew or order mass arrests. The memory of the military dictatorship in the 1970s was too fresh in people’s minds. Attempts to arrive at a consensus between political leaders on how to quell the unrest quickly broke down. On December 10th there was a 24-hour strike by public-sector unions, despite Karamanlis’s appeal for it to be cancelled.

These events caused alarm among the international strategists of Capital. On 11th December The Economist commented:

“There is something weird and frightening about the sight of a modestly prosperous European country—assumed by most outsiders to have recovered from its rocky history of coups and civil strife—that is suddenly gripped by an urban uprising that the authorities cannot contain.”

The events of December 2008 led inexorably to the fall of the Karamanlis government. George Papandreou, the Pasok leader, called for a general election. “Effectively there is no government…we claim power,” he said. The Pasok gained in popularity as the support for the New Democracy melted away in a welter of financial scandals.

The Pasok government

The general election on October 4th 2009 resulted in a landslide victory for the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) that surprised both the political observers and the Pasok leaders. This was a clear reflection of growing popular discontent. 43.9% of voters backing the party, giving it 160 seats in the 300-member parliament. The centre-right New Democracy party was shattered. It won only 33.5% and 91 seats—its worst-ever showing at the polls.

This was the biggest victory for Pasok since it first came to power in 1981. It goes against the trend Europe in the recent elections where social democratic parties have been defeated. It was a clear vote for change. The Communist Party (KKE) took 7.5% and 21 seats, while Syriza, a left-wing coalition that arose from a split from the CP, took 4.6% and 13 seats. Laos, a far-right party, increased its share of the vote to 5.6% and won 15 seats – at the cost of the ND.

Unlike his father, Andreas Papandreou, and like Blair in Britain, George Papandreou has worked to pull the party to the right. Brought up in Sweden, and educated in the USA, he enjoys friendly relations with Obama. Initially he promised stimulus of up to €3 billion ($4.4 billion) to accelerate economic recovery and above-inflation increases in wages and benefits for public-sector workers. He also promised real rises in wages and pensions to encourage Greeks to spend again. He talked of exporting renewable energy, harvested on sunny mountainsides and windy Aegean Islands, and persuading Greek software developers abroad to set up companies at home, and so on and so forth.

But these reformist dreams immediately evaporated like a drop of hot water on a hot stove. They came into conflict with the harsh reality of economic crisis, collapsing tax revenues and a soaring budget deficit. The Karamanlis government admitted that Greece had manipulated its figures to qualify for the euro in 2001. Papandreou admitted that this year’s budget deficit was not 6.7% but 12.7%.

George Papandreou. Photo by philippe grangeaud  / solfé  communications.George Papandreou. Photo by philippe grangeaud / solfé communications.It is true that the Greek capitalists, with the mentality of a petty haggler in the marketplace who wishes to sell rotten fish by placing fresh ones on the top, tried to get round the problem by the simple expedient of falsifying the statistics to conceal the facts – something they are, incidentally, not alone in practicing. But sooner or later the facts become known. The source of the problem, however, was not in Athens and its faulty accounting.

The problem is precisely with the mechanism of the “free market economy”, which operates with the same rationality as a herd of antelopes in the veldt. As long as the market was heading upwards, they did not pay any attention to the niceties of economic and financial soundness. But once the markets head downwards panic sets in and a stampede begins. Now that the stampeded has begun, nothing can stop it. The speculators rush blindly from one market to another in search of a safe haven. In the process, they trample the crops, demolish houses and kill anyone who stands in their path.

The markets decide

There was an old saying: man proposes and God disposes. Nowadays it would be more correct to say: Man proposes but the Market disposes. With a budget deficit almost 13% and a public debt of 125% of GDP, international investors were not impressed with Papandreou’s promises, and sent him a little message to convey their opinion. Spreads on Greek government bonds over German Bunds began to widen, and have continued to widen ever since. This is the financial equivalent of laying hold of a man’s genitals and exerting a gentle squeeze.

Papandreou wants social peace with fiscal austerity. But the two things are incompatible. Papandreou wants to avoid direct confrontation with the trade unions, but he has only two alternatives: either he defends the interests of the workers or those of the capitalists. And he has made his choice. Papandreou is compelled to cut living standards in order to placate the almighty Market, just as Agamemnon was obliged to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia in order to placate the Gods of Olympus. However, Agamemnon ended up very badly as a result of his actions, and his successor will not end up any better as a result of his.

The Greek premier is trying to hide behind the IMF and the anonymous “international speculators” that have brought Greece to its knees. But for the millions of Greek workers who are faced with savage cuts in their living standards, these arguments do not excuse the actions of the Pasok leaders. The Greek workers hate the speculators, the IMF and the bourgeois leaders of the EU. But they cannot forgive a government that, while calling itself socialist, has so readily bent the knee to the IMF and Brussels.

Immediately, Papandreou found himself ground between two millstones. The prime minister’s promises of fiscal austerity have not convinced the markets. For every step back the reformist leaders take, the bourgeois will demand ten more. The Economist remarked: “By Greek standards Mr Papandreou has been courageous, but he should have been braver still. Ireland set the pace on December 9th by producing a budget that sharply cut public-sector wages.” And it added: “Hard times, unfortunately, demand harsh measures.” Here is the real voice of the bourgeois: stony-faced, hard hearted, and completely impervious to human suffering. All must be sacrificed on the altar of Capital!

The austerity measures approved by the Athens government were too little for the bourgeoisie, but too much for the workers. The Greek workers, following their marvelous revolutionary traditions, immediately reacted with mass street demonstrations. Feeling themselves betrayed by the government they hoped would defend jobs and living standards, the workers of Greece have taken to the streets. For months, Athens and other cities have been rocked by mass protest demonstrations. One bourgeois commentator in Britain described the situation in the following terms: “Greek workers against European bankers.” That puts it very well.

Marx wrote that France was the country where the class struggle was always fought to the finish. The same can be said of Greece. The memories of the Civil War and the bitter divisions between Left and Right, and later of the Junta and the Polytechnic uprising of 1974 are burned on the consciousness of the masses. The divisions between the classes constitute a fault line running through Greek society that can explode at any time.

The question can be put very simply: the bourgeoisie cannot afford to maintain the concessions that were forced from them in the past. But the working class cannot tolerate any further attacks on their living standards and conditions. The workers of Europe will not stand with their arms folded while the conquests of the last fifty years are systematically destroyed. The developments in Greece therefore show what will happen in every country in Europe as the crisis unfolds.

Part two »

http://www.marxist.com/new-state-in-crisis-of-capitalism-part-one.htm

A new stage in the crisis of capitalism - Part Two



In the second part of his article, Alan Woods looks at the dire economic situation the European Union faces. He also analyses the effects of the European crisis on the world economy.

The European Union

During the Cold War European capitalists attempted to form a bloc to defend themselves, on the one hand, against the might of the USSR, on the other hand, against the encroaching power of the USA. The collapse of the USSR and the achievement of a unified Germany in 1989 gave a further impetus to European economic integration. The German bourgeoisie and its political representative Kohl, had big ambitions. The euro was in large part an attempt by Berlin to achieve by economic means what Hitler attempted to do by force – to unify Europe under German domination.

Drawing by LatuffDrawing by LatuffThe euro zone has a single central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), and therefore has only one monetary policy, regardless of whether it is located in Athens or Berlin. But in reality, the whole project was dominated by German capital. Initially, Germany benefited from free access to other European markets, and the others benefited from access to seemingly unlimited supplies of capital, investment, loans, grants and credits. Everything seemed to be for the best in the best of all capitalist worlds.

In order to convince Berlin to share its currency with the rest of Europe, it was agreed that the euro zone should be modeled after the Bundesbank. The Euro itself was to be as strong as the deutschmark. As a condition for joining the euro zone, every country had to agree to rigorous “convergence criteria”. These were intended to synchronize the economy of the member states with that of Germany.

These criteria included a budget deficit of less than 3 percent of gross domestic product. Government debt levels were to be no more than 60 percent of GDP. An annual inflation could be no higher than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the lowest three members’ annual inflation. Now all these plans lie in ruins. As we predicted more than ten years ago, it is impossible to achieve convergence criteria for economies that are moving in different directions. Greece’s failure to comply with the Growth and Stability Pact is only the most blatant case. But the truth is that from the very beginning none of the euro zone member states — including France and Germany — have complied with the rules.

Now deep cracks have opened up which threaten to bring down the whole artificial construction and bury all the dreams of a united capitalist Europe. Sarkozy at one point threatened to pull out of the single currency if Germany didn't agree to pay up.

Big banks in France and Germany would be devastated if there was default in Greece or Portugal, since they have lent most of the money.

Will the euro zone break up?

The trouble with the euro is that it attempts to unite economies that are pulling in different directions. The European bourgeois are striving with all their might to keep the currency union together. They are acting on the old thieves’ saying: either we hang together or we will hang separately. But the crisis has revealed the underlying fault lines that threaten to break the euro zone apart and even pose a question mark over the future of the European Union itself. The tensions are increasing all the time.

When the euro was born a decade ago, it came with central rules limiting budget deficits and banning bail-outs. Yet the rules, which theoretically included huge fines for excessive borrowing, were never likely to stick, and were soon emasculated by France and Germany. The financial markets assumed that no euro-area country would ever be allowed to go bust: they assumed that the European Central Bank would always come to the rescue. Now, despite the latest bailout, this can no longer be taken for granted.

This time, Germany has agreed to back a “rescue fund”. But there are profound tensions in Germany. If the crisis deepens and the national tensions increase, it could possibly cause Germany to quit the euro zone altogether. The idea is rapidly gathering ground in Germany that Greece and the euro zone’s other weaker economies should be excluded from the currency union if they do not pay their debts. At one point it seemed that Chancellor Merkel herself was in favour of this.

It is therefore not at all ruled out that the present crisis will end with the “reconstitution” of the Euro zone, either by the expulsion of Greece or the withdrawal of Germany. But the latter variant would mean in effect, the total breakup of the experiment. It would plunge world currency markets into a deep crisis and wreck the weak economic revival.

If Greece were to withdraw from the euro, its central bank could print money and purchase government debt, bypassing the credit markets. It would also allow Athens to devalue, which would stimulate external demand for Greek exports and spur economic growth. The alternative is to resort to a painful “internal devaluation” via austerity measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.

The problem is that no one would want this new currency, particularly because it would be clear to everyone that the government would only be reintroducing it to devalue it. In effect, the drachma would only be accepted within Greece, and even there it would not be accepted everywhere. It would lead immediately to a black market, which would have to be put down by force. The cost of exit would therefore be prohibitively high.

How can the present crisis be resolved? In theory, the expulsion of member states is illegal. In any case, it would have to be approved by of all 27 member states, which poses the intriguing question: why should Greece approve its own expulsion? Even if it could be arranged, it is clear that Portugal, Spain and Ireland would not be very keen to vote for a measure that would provide a precedent for their own exclusion in the not-too-distant future.

Of course, there are very clever people sitting in Brussels whose creative powers can surely enable them to think of some bureaucratic solution that would bend the rules to allow the European Union to get rid of undesirable members without formally breaking the treaties. They could, for instance, set up a new European Union with a new “strong” euro zone, minus Greece (and any other awkward customers).

Such a step would eliminate one problem, but only at the cost of creating many new contradictions. Germany would greatly increase its power, and that is not something the rest of Europe would be enthusiastic about. In a new euro zone composed of, say, France and the Benelux countries, Germany’s economy would represent 45.6 percent of overall output, as opposed to 26.8 percent of euro zone now. Moreover, the excluded states might take their revenge by defaulting on their debts, which would have a devastating effect on the new euro zone.

Parasitism of capitalists

The bourgeois has long ago lost all interest in productive activity and productive investment. It seeks to make money out of money without having to bother with the painful and risky process of production. With a few exceptions, like China, where huge profits can be made from the exploitation of a vast pool of labour from the countryside, the bourgeoisie has tended to rely more and more on the parasitic service sector, and especially the financial sector. That is why they always present the crisis as a crisis of credit.

This is an entirely mystical way of presenting the question. Credit can never play an independent role in the economy. Credit is only a way of expanding consumption beyond its natural limits, either individual consumption of commodities, or the consumption of machinery, raw materials and labour power by the capitalists themselves.

The purely parasitic nature of modern capitalism is seen by the fact that when the banks ran up huge debts, the state immediately stepped in to shower them with vast amounts of public money. The bankers said “thank you very much” and then proceeded to pocket the money, or pour it into a black hole (nobody knows how deep it is or where it leads), helping themselves to generous bonuses in the process.

There is no sign of all this massive injection of public funds into the banks having any serious effect on the real economy. Economic life remains at a very low level and unemployment remains stubbornly high. There is very little real gain to be shown for such a huge expenditure of public money. The reason is not hard to explain. Given the huge amount of excess capacity on a world scale, there is little or no incentive for the capitalists to spend large sums of money on productive investment. There is one third excess capacity in the car industry on a world scale. Why should Ford and General Motors build new plants, when they already have too many factories and not enough paying customers?

“The banks must be saved!” That is all. The politicians immediately come running with an open cheque book. And the Social Democrat politicians run faster than anybody else. Having “saved the banks” (that is, having saved the bankers), the politicians then sadly inform a bewildered public that, well, actually, we never had the money to pay the bankers in the first place. We had to borrow it in your name and now you must pay it all back. Time for sacrifice!

Once the banks have pocketed the money of the state, the markets (that is to say, the same bankers) suddenly begin to shout: “Look! There is an unsustainable level of public debt! This must be paid immediately!” In the midst of this unholy hullabaloo, nobody asks the simple question: Why is there a high level of public debt? And nobody asks where all the money has gone to. Here we enter the mysterious realm of banking secrets, which must be maintained as absolutely as the secrets of the confession box in church.

What is the “credit crunch”?

As long as the world capitalist economy was going forward, markets were booming, profits were soaring, credit was easy. Nobody looked too closely at the balance sheets of companies, banks or nations. Everybody was enjoying the merry carnival of money making. The values on the stock exchange are soaring to heights that bear no relation to the real economy? Let them soar! The banks are lending money they do not have? Let them lend! Greece wants to borrow a billion or two? Let them have it!

But when the day of reckoning comes (as it always does) the mood of the bourgeois changes abruptly. Now nobody wants to lend money. On the contrary, they are all calling in their debts. Instead of the former cheerful open-handedness, there is a mean and grasping mentality, like that of a miser who greedily hoards his loot and guards it jealously so that nobody will see how much he has got. Hoarding is a typical feature of primitive capitalism in its early stages. In a crisis, it is as if the bourgeois have returned to their beginnings, like a man in the stage of decrepit senility who returns to a second childhood.

Now nobody wants promissory notes. They do not want promises of any kind, because they no longer trust anybody: creditors, bankers or governments. They want the real thing. They want cash in hand. And they want it now. This meanness takes no account of the real problems faced by families, businesses or governments. You do not have enough food to eat? Then starve, but pay me what you owe. Your business will have to close, and hundreds will lose their employment? Then close it, and be damned, but pay up! And if this absolute rule of Capital is appropriate in the case of individuals and businesses, why should a nation state be any different? It is the business of Capital to make money. Whatever problems may arise from this money-making activity is an irrelevant matter.

Marx describes this tendency to hoard money in a crisis:

“Countries in which the bourgeois form of production is developed to a certain extent, limit the hoards concentrated in the strong rooms of the banks to the minimum required for the proper performance of their peculiar functions. Whenever these hoards are strikingly above their average level, it is, with some exceptions, an indication of stagnation in the circulation of commodities, of an interruption in the even flow of their metamorphoses.” (Capital, vol. 1, Section 3, Money, c) Universal Money)

The role of gold

Paper money is only a promise to pay. In the past it was backed by gold and silver. But in the age of the senile decay of capitalism the bourgeois imagined that it could do without gold altogether. The bourgeois economists talked of the “demonetization of gold”. This is complete nonsense. Gold is a commodity, and like all other commodities, has an objective value, determined by the amount of socially necessary labour power expended on its production. Its value as a commodity is high because it is relatively rare and there are high costs involved in its discovery and exploitation.

However, gold has historically evolved as “the commodity of commodities” – that commodity through which all other commodities express their values, that is, money. It is a standard of price, and also serves as a universal measure of value, the equivalent commodity par excellence, to use Marx’s expression.

The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, which set up the international monetary regime that prevailed from the end of World War II until the early 1970s, established the dollar as the medium of world trade (with the pound sterling as a secondary currency). In reality, however, currencies were still pegged to gold at a value fixed in dollar terms.

At that time the USA could dictate terms to the rest of the world. After the War, the productive apparatus of the USA was intact, while Europe and Japan were devastated. Two thirds of all the gold stocks in the world were in Fort Knox. The dollar was therefore “as good as gold”.

When the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971, Washington liquidated the Bretton Woods agreement that pegged currency to gold. Currencies were allowed to float. While the U.S. dollar was still regarded as the world currency, the deutschmark began to emerge as a strong contender for this role.

The paper currencies in use throughout the world today are no longer backed by gold. Therefore they hold no value except the political decision to make them the legal tender of commercial activity. Refusal to accept paper currency is, within limitations, punishable by law. But this means governments must be willing and able to enforce the currency as a legal form of debt settlement. But what happens if a government has such a high level of debt that it is unable to meet its liabilities?

By abandoning the link to gold, the bourgeoisie created the conditions for the kind of currency competition and beggar-my-neighbour devaluations that was one of the main factors that transformed the crisis of 1929 into the Great Depression of the 1930s. In the last few years the US authorities were content to see the dollar slide against the euro and other currencies in order to boost its exports to the rest of the world.

Some of the more obtuse politicians actually believed the nonsense of the bourgeois economists about the “demonetization of gold”. Thus, Gordon Brown sold off Britain’s substantial gold reserves between 1999 and 2002, and in the process obtained a mere $4bn for what today would be worth more than $15bn. This little detail reveals at once the intellectual bankruptcy of bourgeois political economists and reformist politicians, which, in this case, contributed directly to national bankruptcy.

The flight into gold

As the credit ratings of Greece, Spain and Portugal fall, so the world market price of gold is soaring far more than most other commodities. This always happens in a crisis, when the capitalists look for a safe harbour to shelter from the storm. In uncertain times, the financial gamblers of yesterday suddenly lose their taste for risky operations. The hard-headed men of money are no longer interested in paper money, or promises of any sort, whether from private individuals, bankers or Greek Prime Ministers. They want only the real thing: cash in hand, ready money – real money, that is, gold.

Let the academics, the professors of economics with long lists of letters after their name, deliver lectures on the demonetization of gold. Those who really hold our economic destinies in the palm of their hand, are unimpressed by such lectures, which only confirm them in their instinctive belief that the most ignorant people in society are to be found between the four walls of universities. Instead, they repeat the words of Shakespeare in Timon of Athens:

“Gold? Yellow, glittering, precious gold?
No, Gods, I am no idle votarist! ...
Thus much of this will make black white, foul fair,
Wrong right, base noble, old young, coward valiant.
... Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides,
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads:
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions, bless the accursed;
Make the hoar leprosy adored, place thieves
And give them title, knee and approbation
With senators on the bench: This is it
That makes the wappen’d widow wed again;
She, whom the spital-house and ulcerous sores
Would cast the gorge at, this embalms and spices
To the April day again. Come, damned earth,
Thou common whore of mankind, that put’st odds
Among the rout of nations.”

The bourgeois are anxious to get their hands on gold, hoping its glitter will defy the laws of economics and maintain their fortunes until the dawn of better times. Indeed. Long before the crisis of 2007 many financial speculators were already getting rid of paper money and building up their stock of bullion. As soon as that happened, savvy shoppers followed. The big-time investors, as always, led the way, and are now being followed by everyone else, pushing the price of gold to astronomic levels.

Refineries in South Africa say they are overwhelmed by orders from Germany for Krugerrand gold coins. This indicates that ordinary people are buying gold, not just professional investors. In Germany memories of hyper-inflation in the 1930s still survive. The Austrian mint says it ran out of its stock of similar coins last week, as the price of an ounce of gold passed through the €1,000 barrier for the first time.

The “speculators” (read, capitalists) do not have any faith in the euro, and still less in the pound sterling. The dollar has risen recently, but this is a sign of desperation and the weakness of alternative currencies. It is certainly not justified by the strength of the US economy or the state of its finances. Under these conditions one would expect to see a flight from paper money into gold and other things that may hold or increase their value (works of art). And that is just what we are seeing.

Germany

The European bourgeois are looking to the future with dread. They must tread carefully, because they are walking on a minefield. With every step they take, the bourgeoisie and its political representatives must constantly look over their shoulders to see how the working class is reacting. That is the main problem. After decades of relative prosperity, the working class will not allow their living standards to be destroyed without a fight. And that is just as true of the German workers as it is in Greece.

Merkel paid the price on May 9th, when she suffered her worst political defeat in more than five years in office. The very evening when European finance ministers were meeting in Brussels to defend the stability of the euro, voters in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany’s most populous state, ejected the chancellor’s allies from office. Voters unseated a coalition between her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) similar to the one in Berlin.

Merkel was not to blame for the euro crisis but when it came she delayed taking measures. On the one hand she wanted to exert extra pressure on Greece, but also Spain, Italy and Portugal to introduce draconian austerity packages. On the other she was hoping that bail-outs of Greece and other weak euro-zone members could be put off until after NRW’s election. But the delay only made matters worse. The defeat in NRW has deprived the Merkel government of its majority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature, which represents the states. To enact most money bills the government will now have to co-operate with the opposition.

The economic crisis is causing divisions at the top that sooner or later must lead to an open split in the government. The pressure will mount. Everyone is in favour of deficit reduction in principle but in practice it is another matter. Merkel now presents herself as the guardian of economic stability. But who will decide where the axe will fall? Some suggest cuts to education and child care. Health-care is another candidate for “reform” – that is, the axe. The crisis of the bourgeoisie is shown in the contradictory advice given to Merkel: “Be bold”, she is told, “but do not offend the voters”. How this miracle is to be accomplished we are not informed.

The bourgeoisie faces a dilemma, not just in Germany but in all Europe. The seriousness of the economic crisis means that they will have to inflict deep cuts on the workers and the middle class, but the social and political consequences of such actions will completely undermine them. To solve this dilemma is only slightly more difficult than trying to square the circle. Every attempt to restore the economic equilibrium will destroy the social and political equilibrium.

The German bourgeoisie is resentful of bail-outs, fearful about the euro’s stability and increasingly unwilling to identify Germany’s interests with those of Europe. This is a far cry from the grandiloquent speeches of Kohl about European unity and Germany’s role at the centre of it.

World economy

The looming crisis looks very similar to the last, with the financial system, and banks in particular, at the centre. This fact reflects the fundamental sickness of capitalism in the epoch of its senile decay. What now being presented as a monetary crisis will become a prolonged economic and political crisis affecting every country in Europe.

Deutsche Bank analysts have warned clients that if the one trillion dollar EU rescue package fails to calm markets US GDP growth could be reduced by half to one percent over the next couple of years. "If the rescue program fails altogether, we are looking at a potentially much more negative picture, with the distinct possibility of a double-dip recession."

This will have profound effects on the entire world. The economic recovery has a very fragile character, and could be derailed by events that began in one small corner of Europe. World stock markets have given way to scarcely concealed panic. Instead of “green shoots”, respected commentators are beginning to talk ominously about another Great Recession.

The U.S. capitalists were hoping that they could dramatically increase exports to Europe. But the steep drop in the value of the euro (about $1.25, down from more than $1.50 in November 2009) makes American goods more expensive compared with those produced in Europe. The American economy will be hard hit by a new banking crisis and a fall in exports to Europe. It would be harder to borrow money or raise finance for businesses.

In a crisis the banks stop lending to each other and begin closing down credit lines, sparking a chain reaction throughout the financial system. The banking systems in Europe and the United States are closely interconnected and European banks must have serious repercussions in the USA.

Daniel Tarullo, a member of the Federal Reserve's board, recently warned that a repeat of the 2008 crisis which saw the near collapse of the US financial sector was "not out of the question." He told Congress last week that banks were going through spasms that "brought back memories of developments during the recent global financial crisis." The decline in the common European currency also makers it less likely that China will accept with U.S. demands to raise the value of their money, making it easier for U.S. products to compete.

« Part one To be continued...

http://www.marxist.com/new-stage-in-crisis-of-capitalism-part-two.htm

dimanche 30 mai 2010

ما هي تداعيات الأزمة الأوروبية على تونس؟


عبداللطيف الفراتي


يبدو أن الولايات المتحدة التي كانت وراء الأزمة المالية الإقتصادية الأكبر منذ أزمة 1930/1933 قد خرجت من عين الإعصار، وبقدرتها على التكيف السريع ، والتعامل الذكي مع التطورات ، فإنها تكون قد ودعت تداعيات الإنكماش الإقتصادي الذي عرفته، وتعيد الإرتباط مع نسبة نمو عالية جدا للعام الحالي يتوقع أن تبلغ 3.5 في المائة وهي نسبة عالية بالنسبة لبلد متقدم.

ما شهدته أمريكا إذن هي هزة شديدة ناتجة عن عدم سيطرة أجهزة التعديل على سوق انفرط عقدها وتخلت فيه على حد تعبير الخبير التونسي أحمد الكرم عن الدور التقليدي للجهاز المالي في توفير السند اللازم للمسار الإقتصادي للدخول في متاهات مضاربات اتجهت إلى تحقيق ربح سريع وكبير.

وما حصل في أمريكا هو إفلاس كثير من المؤسسات البنكية والمالية والعقارية ، مع ما جر إليه ذلك من اضطرابات كبيرة، كانت قابلة للعلاج.

عند تماثل الإقتصاد الأمريكي للشفاء ، بعد تسجيل ما حصل في خانة الربح والخسارة ، كان المعتقد انه سيجر كقاطرة قوية الإقتصاد الأوروبي ومعه العالمي، ولكن هاهي أوروبا تتخلف ، بل تصبح مهددة في وحدة عملتها وفي مصيرها المتقدم. في أمريكا انتهت الأزمة بإفلاس عدد كبير من المؤسسات واستوعب الإقتصاد الأمريكي ذلك وهضمه، وانطلقت العربة من جديد، أما أزمة 2010 في أوروبا فإنها من طبيعة أخرى. ليست مؤسسات هي المهددة بالإفلاس بل دول بكاملها، ودولة بالذات انهارت ، وهي كالغريق تبدو وكأنها تسعى لسحب غيرها للقاع في غرقها.

اليونان بعد أن انكشف الغطاء، ظهر أنها تعيش على وقع مديونية في مستوى 120 في المائة من الناتج الداخلي الخام (الحجم الأقصى المسموح به وفق اتفاقيات ماستريخت الأوروبية 60 في المائة) ، وظهر أيضا أن مستوى عجز الميزانية يقارب 14 في المائة ( العجز الأقصى المقبول 3 في المائة)، معنى هذا أن على أثينا أن تسدد كأصل دين وفوائد فوق دخلها لمدة سنة، معناه أيضا أن انحسار الثقة يفرض عليها لتحقيق ذلك أن تدفع نسب فائدة عالية جدا لتمويل ذلك السداد، إلى حد ربوي، معناه كذلك إن موازنة الدولة لم تعد لها أي طاقة على التوفير، وأنها في حاجة إلى عملية تنحيف قاسية.

فكان لا بد من اتخاذ قرارات تقشفية ذات مذاق جد مرير ، مثل تجميد وحتى تخفيض المرتبات وجرايات التقاعد، ومثل زيادة الضرائب وترفيع نسبها.

هذه القرارات اللاشعبية لم تكن مقبولة، وأدت إلى تظاهرات وإضرابات لا تنتهي.

وإذ جاء المدد من الاتحاد الأوروبي ومن المؤسسات المالية الدولية، ما أنقذ الدولة اليونانية من حالة كف سداد دفع ديونها، فإن المراقبين يشكون في قدرة الإقتصاد اليوناني على استرداد عافيته على مدى سنوات طويلة.

فكل من عملية تخفيف عبء المديونية ، وخفض عجز الموازنة يتطلب تضحيات على مدى سنوات ، في بلد تعود على سوء التصرف والحوكمة السيئة ( الحكم غير الرشيد) وغياب الشفافية ، والفساد المستشري وغيرها من العناصر التي يصعب التحول عنها لأنها باتت أساس مسيرة مجتمع بكامله. سقنا هنا مثل اليونان لأنه المثل الأقصى ، ولكن أوروبا الجنوبية بكاملها من إسبانيا والبرتغال وإيطاليا كلها ترزح تحت أعباء أكثر أو أقل حدة، وهناك من يضيف فرنسا هذا عدا الوضع السيء جدا لبلدان مثل بريطانيا التي تركها العماليون على الحديدة كما يقول المثل وإيرلندا، ورومانيا التي اضطرت لخفض الأجور بنسبة 25 في المائة دفعة واحدة.

تداعيات ذلك برزت وكما يجب أن تظهر، في إصابة اليورو بوعكة ، هددت وما زالت تهدده حتى في وجوده.

فقد سجل انهياره أمام الدولار وعملات أخرى. تداعيات ذلك برزت أيضا في البورصات العالمية ، ولكن خاصة الأوروبية . وفي وضع طبيعي ، فإن الحكومات وبنوكها المركزية لتصحيح الأشياء ، تقدم على تخفيض قيمة عملتها، غير أن اليورو ليس عملة وطنية، بل إن الدول الست عشرة في أوروبا التي قبلت الدخول في منطقته والتظلل بمظلته( 11 دولة من الإتحاد الأوروبي لم تلتحق) ، فقدت السيادة على عملتها ولم يعد بإمكانها أن تصحح أوضاعها عن طريق عملتها، فخضعت لاختيارات ليست اختياراتها ودفعت ثمنا غاليا لذلك. باختصار، فإن اليورو قد فقد على مدى 10 أسابيع تقريبا حوالي 10إلى 15 في المائة من قيمته أمام الدولار, أي إن التصحيح قامت به السوق ولم يكن اختيارا ذاتيا. وهذا الوضع يقطع مع التوجهات السائدة التي كانت تريد أن تحافظ على قيمة العملة الأوروبية كأقوى عملة في العالم. ما يهمنا هنا هو مدى تأثيرات الأزمة اليونانية أساسا والأوروبية عموما علينا ،وهل لها من انعكاسات على أوضاعنا الإقتصادية والإجتماعية ؟

للأمر وجهان: الوجه الأول هو المتمثل في هبوط قيمة العملة الأوروبية والوجه الثاني هو المتمثل في ارتفاع في قيمة الدولار الأمريكي.

وعلى أهمية الإنهيار في قيمة اليورو بالمقارنة مع الدولار، فإن ذلك الهبوط لم يمثل بالنسبة إلينا وللدينار التونسي سوى 2 في المائة للفترة ما بين 11 جانفي و21 ماي الماضيين. ولكن يمثل بالدولار ارتفاعا للعملة الأمريكية بما بين 10 و 15 ي المائة.

وإذ إن كل انخفاض في قيمة عملة ما يوازيه ارتفاع بالنسبة للعملة المقابلة ، فإن ذلك يفرز ميكانيكية معينة. تهاود في أسعار المواد الموردة من جانبنا باليورو، وارتفاع في أسعار المواد الموردة من طرفنا بالدولار.

ولما كانت معاملاتنا في غالبها تجري باليورو باعتبار أن حوالي 80 في المائة من تجارتنا الخارجية تتم مع أوروبا، فإن بلادنا في المحصلة ستستورد البضائع بصورة أرخص ولو قليلا، ومما يضاعف هذه الإستفادة أننا نستورد كثيرا مواد أولية أو تجهيزات أو نصف مصنعة ، لنعيد تصديرها.

ولكن وبالمقابل فإن صادراتنا بحكم انخفاض اليورو ، ستتكلف أغلى لدى المورد الأوروبي. ولكن العكس صحيح بالنسبة للمعاملات بالدولار المرتفع، غير أن المبادلات التونسية بالدولار لا تكاد تذكر، ولذلك فإن أثرها ليس كبيرا. على أن السائح الأوروبي والمتعامل باليورو سيضطر لدفع يوروات أكثر عندما ينتقل لبلادنا، ولكن أيضا للبلدان المنافسة لتونس.

ومهما يكن من أمر فإن السياسات التقشفية الأوروبية عموما ، وتجميد الأجور أو حتى تخفيضها ستصيب بالضرر النشاط السياحي ، وهو عادة النشاط الأكثر هشاشة. غير أن ارتفاع سعر الدولار وانخفاض سعر اليورو له انعكاسات أخرى لا ينبغي إغفالها وهي المتمثلة في سداد المديونية وفوائدها، ومن هذه الناحية فإن تونس مستفيدة من هذه التقلبات بين العملات وباعتبار الإنخفاض في اليورو فإن بلادنا ستجني من وضع قائم وهو أن حوالي 57 في المائة من المديونية التونسية محررة باليورو، ما يعني أن تونس ستدفع يوروات أقل لنفس حجم المديونية المسددة.

ولعل المؤمل أن لا تدوم هذه الأزمات طويلا، حتى لا تؤثر على مدى أطول على انتعاشة بدأت تلوح في الأفق.

عبداللطيف الفراتي

رئيس التحرير الأسبق

http://www.assabah.com.tn/article.php?ID_art=35103

mercredi 26 mai 2010

قاسيون | أعراض ركود عالمي جديد











القسم: اقتصاد | التاريخ: 2010-05-26


تتعاظم الخشية من أن العالم مقبل على ركود اقتصادي عالمي جديد حاد في ظل أزمة الديون التي اندلعت شرارتها من اليونان قبل أن تستشري في دول أوروبية كثيرة. وتبدو الاضطرابات التي تشهدها أسواق الأسهم, والانخفاض الحاد لليورو مقابل الدولار الأميركي من بين علامات تشير إلى أن الأزمة الراهنة قد تطيح بالانتعاش الاقتصادي العالمي الهش الذي مضى على بدئه شهور قليلة.
ودفعت حالة الاضطراب في الأسواق معلقين إلى إطلاق تحذيرات من أن الاقتصاد ربما ينزلق إلى ركود كالذي تسببت فيه الأزمة المالية, وكان الأسوأ منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية وربما منذ الكساد العظيم في ثلاثينيات القرن الماضي.

فشل كارثي
وحذر محللون في مصرف دويتشه بنك الألماني من أن نمو الاقتصاد الأميركي قد يتقلص بواقع النصف إلى 1% فقط في العامين المقبلين إذا فشلت حزمة إنقاذ أوروبية بقيمة تريليون دولار، أقرها قادة الاتحاد الأوروبي هذا الشهر لمساعدة أعضاء، عن الوفاء بالتزاماتها المالية.
وأضافوا أن فشل برنامج الإنقاذ الأوروبي سيفضي على الأرجح إلى تجدد الركود الذي ضرب الاقتصاد العالمي في العامين الماضيين.
ويشير خبراء إلى أن هناك أعراضا لأزمة اقتصادية تشبه بصورة كبيرة أعراض الأزمة الماضية, كما أنهم يشيرون إلى علامات على ذلك في النظام المالي, خاصة البنوك.

انهيار ليمان براذرز مطلع خريف 2008
ومن أولئك الخبراء دانيال تارولو العضو في مجلس إدارة الاحتياطي الاتحادي الأميركي (البنك المركزي) الذي توقع انهيارا ماليا على شاكلة ما حدث في سبتمبر/أيلول 2008 حين انهار بنك ليمان براذرز الاستثماري لتتفجر الأزمة المالية بعد ذلك مباشرة.
وقال تارولو أثناء جلسة استماع في الكونغرس الأسبوع الماضي إن هناك احتمالا بأن تؤثر أزمة الديون في أوروبا على الاقتصاد الأميركي من خلال إضعاف أصول المؤسسات المالية الأميركية.
من جهته, أوضح أوري دادوش المدير السابق للتجارة الدولية في البنك الدولي أن فقدان الثقة بين بنوك أوروبية وأميركية قد يكون عاملا أساسيا في أزمة مالية واقتصادية جديدة تتشكل ملامحها الآن على ما يبدو.
وأشار في هذا الإطار إلى أن أكبر عشرة بنوك أميركية تملك حوالي ستين مليار دولار من ديون دول أوروبية, ويشكل المبلغ نحو عشر رؤوس أموال تلك البنوك.
ويرى محللون في اتساع الهوة بين تكاليف الإقراض في الولايات المتحدة وأوروبا دليلا على القلق المتزايد من نشوب أزمة مالية جديدة.
وفي مقابل التحذير من ركود جديد قد يبدأ من أوروبا إذا ظلت أزمة الديون والموازنات بهذه الوتيرة, يرى بعض المحللين -على غرار أوري دادوش- جوانب مضيئة في الأزمة بالنسبة إلى أووربا.
فالتراجع الكبير لسعر صرف اليورو مقابل الدولار قد يدعم قدرة أوروبا على المنافسة في الأسواق, مثلما أنه سيعزز صادراتها وينتشلها من أزمتها الاقتصادية.
وبعد تدهور قيمة اليورو, باتت تكلفة الصادرات الأميركية والآسيوية إلى أوروبا أعلى بالنسبة إلى الأوروبيين الذين يخشى شركاؤهم أن يقلصوا الاستيراد مع تباطؤ الانتعاش الاقتصادي.

الفرنسية

World Depression: Regional Wars and the Decline of the US Empire

The James Petras website
All the idols of capitalism over the past three decades crashed. The assumptions and presumptions, paradigm and prognosis of indefinite progress under liberal free market capitalism have been tested and have failed.
. 03.25.2009

We are living the end of an entire epoch: Experts everywhere witness the collapse of the US and world financial system, the absence of credit for trade and the lack of financing for investment. A world depression, in which upward of a quarter of the world’s labor force will be unemployed, is looming. The biggest decline in trade in recent world history – down 40% year to year – defines the future. The immanent bankruptcies of the biggest manufacturing companies in the capitalist world haunt Western political leaders. The ‘market’ as a mechanism for allocating resources and the government of the US as the ‘leader’ of the global economy have been discredited. (Financial Times, March 9, 2009) All the assumptions about ‘self-stabilizing markets’ are demonstrably false and outmoded. The rejection of public intervention in the market and the advocacy of supply-side economics have been discredited even in the eyes of their practitioners. Even official circles recognize that ‘inequality of income’ contributed to the onset of the economic crash and should be corrected. Planning, public ownership, nationalization are on the agenda while socialist alternatives have become almost respectable.

Read essay [PDF]

mardi 25 mai 2010

CRISE DE L'EURO EGALE CRISE DU CAPITALISME ! - npa aube

samedi 22 mai

CRISE DE L'EURO EGALE CRISE DU CAPITALISME !

La crise de l'euro n'en finit pas de s'étendre. Elle soulève une double question : faut-il faire payer la crise aux couches sociales les moins favorisées ou à la finance ? Doit-on encourager un retour aux Etats-nations ou la construction d'une Union européenne plus politique et solidaire ?

Parmi ceux qui ne veulent pas faire payer la finance, on trouve les partisans décomplexés du néolibéralisme, mais également tous les défenseurs d'une Union européenne plus forte, comme un but en soi et quelles que soient ses orientations. Tous ceux qui applaudissent au renforcement de la coopération entre gouvernements européens, y compris quand c'est pour mieux s'attaquer aux droits sociaux. Ceux qui se réjouissent de la proposition par les ministres des finances de la zone euro d'un contrôle européen des budgets nationaux avant même leur examen par les parlements, ce qui est en fait une façon de s'assurer que la politique d'austérité drastique prévue soit bien appliquée. Ceux qui, enfin, ont approuvé les décisions européennes du 9 mai dernier du plan de soutien européen, dont le seul objectif était de rassurer les marchés sans chercher à s'attaquer aux racines du mal européen.

Derrière ces décisions se prépare un plan de rigueur à grande échelle, dont la réforme des retraites en France n'est qu'un début : la dette publique constitue une occasion unique d'imposer la logique ultime du néolibéralisme consistant à transférer une part croissante des richesses des salariés, retraités et chômeurs vers les grands détenteurs du capital. Les politiques de diminution des salaires et des pensions, de suppression de postes de fonctionnaires ou d'augmentation des impôts type TVA sont socialement injustes et économiquement inefficaces : cette cure d'austérité entraînera une dépression économique et une baisse des rentrées fiscales plus forte que les économies attendues, ce qui rendra les pays européens incapables de redresser la barre.

Ceux qui souhaitent faire payer la crise à la finance soulignent quant à eux la responsabilité des marchés financiers dans la crise économique, le renflouement sans contrepartie des banques par les Etats, la récession et l'explosion des dettes publiques en Europe qui en ont résulté. Depuis 2007, la crise de la finance privée s'est ainsi transformée en crise des finances publiques ("Crise, la croisée des chemins") et a été accentuée par les cadeaux fiscaux faits aux riches par les gouvernements.

Faire payer la crise à la finance… oui mais comment ? Il existe deux options. La première suppose un retour à une Europe des Etats-nations pour restaurer leur souveraineté, notamment sur le plan monétaire. En découlerait une sortie de l'euro. Moins d'Europe néolibérale, mais moins d'Europe politique… Cette option fait l'hypothèse très incertaine que les gouvernements nationaux seront plus volontaristes que l'Union européenne vis-à-vis de la finance, alors que ce sont ces mêmes gouvernements qui ont mis en place la dérèglementation financière. Elle suppose surtout qu'ils pourront faire face tout seuls à la puissance des marchés financiers, des multinationales et des institutions internationales comme le FMI, largement inféodé aux intérêts états-uniens. Cette option ne peut qu'aggraver la concurrence entre les Etats et la divergence des trajectoires économiques.

VERS UN PROJET SOCIAL ET ÉCOLOGIQUE ALTERNATIF

La seconde option mise sur le renforcement politique de l'Union européenne et de ses politiques budgétaire, fiscale et sociale. Elle repose sur la conviction, vérifiée par la crise, qu'une union monétaire sans véritables politiques économiques communes est vouée à l'échec. Tout comme la réserve fédérale américaine ou la Bank of England, il est temps que la banque centrale européenne (BCE) puisse prêter directement aux Etats à des taux très faibles.

Cette seconde option commanderait également d'agir à la source par une régulation européenne forte des marchés financiers : elle taxerait les transactions financières sur son territoire, obligerait les banques à souscrire à des obligations d'Etat à des taux d'intérêt très bas, interdirait la spéculation sur les dettes publiques par le biais des CDS, et s'attaquerait aux fonds spéculatifs. Une telle régulation des marchés financiers donnerait des marges de manœuvre pour entreprendre des réformes fiscales redistributives aux plans national et européen. L'Union européenne peut inverser la contre-révolution fiscale qui a déchargé les entreprises et le capital de leurs obligations fiscales, par exemple en instaurant une taxe communautaire sur les bénéfices des entreprises et une taxe carbone sur les secteurs émetteurs de gaz à effet de serre. Ceci permettrait la mutualisation d'une part accrue des recettes et des dépenses publiques. Cette politique alternative s'attaquerait également aux déséquilibres commerciaux entre pays européens (notamment entre l'Allemagne et les pays latins) en faisant converger les économies nationales, non par un dumping généralisé, mais par une harmonisation progressive vers le haut des conditions sociales et fiscales.

Utopie européenne, pensez-vous ? Les marchés financiers deviennent de plus en plus imprévisibles, l'euro est en crise, chacun se rend compte de l'impasse des solutions actuelles. La crise monétaire menace les Etats eux-mêmes. Leur fuite en avant aggravera considérablement les conditions sociales des populations européennes. Dans cette situation, la construction d'un mouvement social européen, qu'on a pu voir apparaître face à la directive Bolkenstein puis au traité constitutionnel européen (TCE), sera décisive. Elle dépendra de la vitesse à laquelle la prise de conscience de l'impasse actuelle se généralisera en Europe. Nous avions souligné en 2005 lors du débat sur le TCE que l'Europe néolibérale nous conduisait à une impasse, et la majorité de nos concitoyens l'avait compris. En 2010, la crise démontre, une nouvelle fois, l'échec de cette Europe dominée par les marchés, sans union politique. Seule une sortie de crise par le haut, vers un projet social et écologique alternatif, sauvera la construction européenne.

Dominique Plihon est président du conseil scientifique d'Attac et Aurélie Trouvé est coprésidente d'Attac. Ils sont enseignants-chercheurs en économie.

http://npatroyesaube.canalblog.com/archives/2010/05/22/17974358.html

DEBAT LA CRISE DU CAPITALISME PARIS BERLIN JANVIER 2009

DEBAT LA CRISE DU CAPITALISME PARIS BERLIN JANVIER 2009
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5300076313757639941#

Impact de la baisse de l’euro sur l’économie de la Tunisie

Impact de la baisse de l’euro sur l’économie de la Tunisie


La glissade de l’euro s’est accélérée ces dernières semaines sur fond d’inquiétudes croissantes quant à la solvabilité de certains des Etats membres de l’Union européenne (UE). Les experts prévoient même une parité euro/dollar de 1,15 en fin d’année. Comment l’économie tunisienne, fortement amarrée à la zone euro, va-t-elle réagir face à cette situation ? Par Ridha Kéfi



Dès le 10 mai, en pleine crise grecque, le Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali a conféré avec M. Mohamed Ghannouchi, au Palais de Carthage. Passant en revue avec le Premier ministre la situation économique du pays à la lumière de l’évolution de la crise dans la zone euro et de ses éventuelles répercussions sur les échanges extérieurs de la Tunisie, le Chef de l’Etat a notamment décidé de créer une commission de suivi à ce sujet et donné des instructions pour approfondir l’étude des mesures susceptibles de garantir la sécurité de l’économie nationale.
Ces mesures concernent la rationalisation des dépenses publiques, la maîtrise des dépenses liées aux produits de consommation importés, l’amélioration de la productivité et l’accroissement de la compétitivité de l’économie. Il s’agit avant tout de préserver les équilibres macroéconomiques du pays, les emplois et le pouvoir d’achat des catégories à faible revenu.

Retombées sur la balance des payements
Au cours des deux dernières semaines, la situation en Europe a continué à évoluer de façon erratique, sinon à se dégrader. L’euro a atteint son plus bas niveau depuis 2006. Il a perdu près de 18% de sa valeur depuis décembre 2009, date à laquelle il s’échangeait autour des 1,50 contre le dollar.
Les gains de compétitivité associés à cette baisse sont certes une bonne nouvelle pour les économies de la zone euro qui tournent au ralenti avec une consommation intérieure durablement grippé. Peut-on en dire autant en ce qui concerne la Tunisie, dont l’essentiel des échanges économiques (70 à 80%) se fait encore avec le Vieux continent et, donc, en euro ?
A cette question, la réponse de la plupart des économistes est très mitigée. Selon eux, cette baisse ne peut qu’avoir des retombées négatives sur la Tunisie, notamment au niveau de sa balance des payements. Car, comme l’explique l’économiste Abderrahmane Mebtoul, dans ‘‘Algérie-Focus’’ http://www.algerie-focus.com/2010/05/23/cours-dollareuro-et-raisons-de-la-speculation-financiere-en-algerie/, «la dévaluation d’une monnaie permet en principe de dynamiser les exportations d’un pays et la réévaluation de les freiner. Cependant avec la trans-nationalisation du capital (mondialisation), ce serait une erreur de raisonner uniquement au niveau de la balance commerciale car il faut raisonner au niveau de la balance des paiements.»
Et c’est à ce niveau justement que notre pays a le plus à craindre. En effet, les recettes de la Tunisie en euro dépassent ses payements en cette même monnaie. Sa balance nette étant positive en euro, ses recettes en cette monnaie se déprécient nécessairement.
Cette situation a son corollaire, qui est tout aussi inquiétant. Car tout en étant créancière dans une monnaie qui se déprécie, la Tunisie est débitrice dans une monnaie que si valorise, le dollar. Nous avons malheureusement plus de payement que de recettes en cette monnaie. Pour caractériser cette situation, les économistes parlent d’«effet de ciseau»: moins de recettes, plus de payements. Notre pays serait alors perdant des deux côtés.
Comment gérer la parité de la monnaie nationale dans ce cas ?
Le cours de l’euro exprimé en dinar ne baisse pas, alors que le cours du dollar exprimé en dinar augmente sensiblement, contrairement à ce que cela devrait être pour refléter un tant soit peu la situation du marché international. Cela voudrait dire que le dinar va continuer à glisser sensiblement. Serait-ce une bonne chose?
Les économistes sont unanimes: cette situation provoquerait une hausse du taux d’inflation, qui est déjà passé, depuis le début de la crise, de 2,5 à 5,1%. Cela n’aidera pas à relancer la demande extérieure du produit tunisien, puisque l’Europe, notre principal marché, est en crise. L’élasticité de la demande européenne risque donc de ne plus jouer en faveur des exportateurs tunisiens.

Un véritable casse-tête

Faut-il réduire le taux d’intérêt pour relancer la machine ? La solution est souvent préconisée comme une panacée. Or, elle n’aurait, dans ce cas, qu’un seul effet: réduire l’endettement des opérateurs économiques les plus endettés. Cela ne se traduirait pas nécessairement par une relance de l’investissement intérieur. Si c’était le cas, la solution serait toute trouvée.
En revanche, la baisse du taux d’intérêt aurait un impact négatif sur l’économie, eu égard, surtout, à la situation de l’épargne nationale, estimé à 23,1% du PIB en 2009, alors que l’on espérait la voir atteindre des taux asiatiques (30% et plus). Par ailleurs, en encourageant la consommation, on risque de bouleverser les fondements de notre système bancaire, qui vit grâce à l’épargne mais dont les bases sont loin d’être solides.
Que faire pour résorber l’impact négatif de la dépréciation de l’euro sur notre économie nationale, alors que l’investissement extérieur a baissé en 2009 (-34%), ainsi que les recettes touristiques en devises (-1,9 %), les transferts en devises des Tunisiens résidant à l’étranger (-7%), les exportations (-18,3), les importations (-18,2%) et la production industrielle orientée vers l’exportation, essentiellement les industries mécaniques et électriques et le secteur du textile et habillement (-10,5) ?
Véritable casse-tête pour les architectes de l’économie tunisienne qui vont devoir prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour atténuer les effets de la crise et maintenir les équilibres macroéconomiques qui ont toujours constitué la force de la Tunisie et la base de sa stabilité et de sa (relative) prospérité. Ils doivent surtout faire faire preuve de beaucoup d’imagination, de doigté et d’équité dans la répartition des répercussions négatives (comme des appuis et des soutiens) entre toutes les catégories de la société.
http://www.kapitalis.com/kapital/34-economie/452-impact-de-la-baisse-de-leuro-sur-leconomie-de-la-tunisie.html

lundi 24 mai 2010

The contradictions of the recovery


PDF Print .
Joel Geier 25 May 2010
A year ago the world was 18 months into the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. The economy was still in “free fall.” The investment banks and the shadow banking system had collapsed, the commercial banks were dysfunctional, and many were going bankrupt. Credit, even lending between banks, was frozen. World industrial production plunged by 20 per cent, as did world trade – a contraction only exceeded during the Great Depression. Nobody knew where the bottom was, and various catastrophists warned that there was no bottom in sight.
It was a serious question as to whether we were about to enter a crisis similar to the Great Depression of the 1930s. But the economy did hit bottom, and over the next several quarters there were increasing signs of a recovery, purchased by the largest financial bailout in world history. The United States and the world economy have been growing since August 2009, but with the exception of Asia and emerging markets, at anaemic rates, particularly when judged by the many trillions of dollars governments have spent to produce this recovery.
Indeed, there is no confidence that recovery is sustainable without ongoing state stimulus; and yet the stimulus is producing deficit and debt problems that could trigger a new stage of the crisis.
This is not a repeat of the 1930s. One reason for this is that lessons were learned from that collapse: use any means necessary to prevent failure of the banking system; don’t allow deep deflation to set in; avoid high protectionist tariffs (which led in the 1930s to the collapse of world trade); and use deficit spending to make up for falling private demand and investment.
The free-fall stage of the crisis began when Henry Paulson, then Secretary of the Treasury, and Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner of the Federal Reserve, decided to allow Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt. The most likely explanation for this decision, aside from stupidity, is that Lehman was allowed to collapse to shock capitalist political culture out of its neoliberal stupor and into accepting the policies necessary to save the system.
Overnight, the dominant capitalist idea of a self-regulating, self-correcting, efficient free market, which operated best when unencumbered by state intervention, went the way of the woolly mammoth. The neoliberal crisis policies of the last 30 years were encapsulated in the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – cut government budgets, cut spending, cut consumption, devalue the currency, and export your way out of the crisis. These prescriptions were immediately discarded during the current financial crisis. The IMF, in a rare moment of candour, repudiated austerity, and confessed that its regulations had worsened recessions.
Instead, there was the reintroduction of Keynesian economics, and the rapid response of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus on an international, coordinated basis. The United States led Japan, the European Union, and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in an unprecedented international fiscal and monetary stimulus. Interest rates were reduced to their lowest level ever. The Federal Reserve continues to provide free money to the banking system, holding interest rates close to zero.
Capitalist governments transferred private capitalist debt from banks and corporations to the state – losses were socialised for the public to pay for. State intervention provided credit, demand, and infrastructure investment. The Bush-Obama administrations saved the banking system, the auto industry, and the housing industry. Their failure would have brought down the rest of the capitalist economy and likely created a 1930s-style depression.
The capitalist state, not the market, produced stabilisation, the end of the free-fall, and the start of a recovery. However, the fundamentals of the capitalist economy are so weak that there is no confidence that if the state were to withdraw stimulus that recovery could be sustained. The fear is that if the “free market” was left to its own solutions and government stimulus sharply curtailed, demand would collapse, renewing recession. All of this has to be subtly presented so that faith in “free enterprise” is not excessively undermined.
In housing and construction, for example, stabilization is problematic and recovery still distant. Four million additional foreclosures are expected in 2010. A quarter of mortgage-holders are under water, their homes valued at less than their mortgages, while a further decline of 10-15 per cent in housing prices could double that number.
Today there is no housing industry – robust or weak – without the state. Eighty per cent of all mortgages are made or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government agencies with state subsidies and guarantees. Their combined losses could cost the government $US400 billion. In addition the state has in the last year bought $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed securities from the banks, including toxic assets to keep the mortgage market functioning.
The banks – despite the apparent “profitability” that is used to justify mega bonuses for their meritorious, hard working, deserving executives – also would be bankrupt without continued state support. The state guarantees their deposits and their loans. The restoration of banking profits has come through three sources: revaluing toxic assets upward (called “mark to make-believe” in the capital markets), government capital to invest in higher paying assets, and speculating with the free money the government provides.
The eighteen largest banks, which the government guaranteed after “stress tests” as too big to fail, now borrow money at on average 29 basis points cheaper than banks without government support. This came to a total of $3.4 billion, half of bank profits last quarter. The banks profit from the steep yield curve by borrowing money from the government at almost zero interest, or taking deposits at pathetically low rates, and recycling them by buying government debt in the form of treasury bonds at three and a half or four per cent, with minimal risk.
The banks have also used the free money to speculate in commodities, stocks and international real estate, creating new bubbles internationally. Goldman Sachs, which converted itself into a bank holding company so as to be eligible for Fed money, made 11 per cent of its 2009 profits from traditional banking, and 72 per cent from speculation – courtesy of the taxpayers.
Despite this government welfare, the banking system continues to bleed in terms of non-performing loans from housing, commercial real estate, auto, credit card, and business loans. The banks have disguised many losses from non-performing loans by rolling them over in what Wall Street insiders call “extend and pretend.” Wall Street’s crisis has not been solved – its losses have been absorbed by the government.
To stay solvent, and to meet capital reserve requirements as loans turn sour, the banks are forced to deleverage – to cut their debt exposure. Bank assets have been cut from $US7.3 trillion to $6 trillion. In the next two years, deleveraging is expected to reduce that to $4 trillion. This severe, ongoing credit contraction will constrict growth for years as consumers, small businesses and start-up companies are denied credit.
Industry is functioning at 70-75 per cent capacity. There is still little or no capital investment in business expansion. In fact, for the first time since the Depression, the means of production slightly declined last year. Corporations are flush with cash. Rather than funding expansion, they are using it to pay down debt, buy back stock, hoard capital, invest in more dynamic markets abroad, and engage in mergers.
There is also no consumer recovery. This is not surprising, given a 9.7 per cent unemployment rate – almost 16 per cent when the number of discouraged and underemployed is taken into account – declining income, saving in homes and pensions wiped out, and no income or job security for those still working. The credit squeeze will force consumers to cut personal debt by $4 trillion in the next few years.
Growth is not coming from industry, the banks, or consumers. This is the first time there is no “engine for growth” in the U.S. outside of the state. The United States has been the engine for growth in the world economy since the Second World War, but not this time. It is China, with its more regulated state-capitalist economy that is currently the main engine for world growth, quickly altering the imperialist balance of power.
New problems
The rapid shift to monetary and fiscal stimulus produced an equally rapid set of new problems that underline the contradictions between the capitalist state and the capitalist market that already reveal the limits of Keynesian economics.
Keynesian policy proved incapable of ending the depression of 1930s – only war production did that. And after being the dominant capitalist economic ideology from the 1930s to the 1970s, it had no answer to the stagflation crisis of the 1970s that marked the end of the post-war boom. Keynesianism was replaced by neoliberalism as the dominant capitalist economic school.
But with the collapse of the neoliberal boom, Keynesianism was the only other coherent set of ideas that capitalism could turn to: state intervention, fiscal and monetary stimulus, deficit spending, cheap credit through low interest rates, the state substituting for the market’s failure to invest – all efforts to stimulate demand, to “prime the pump” until the market could be “self-sustaining.”
Keynesianism can take credit for ending the free fall, saving the banks and producing what stability there is. But the government deficit and debt its policies recommended come up against the limits that the capitalist system, with its capital markets that function solely for private profit, are willing to fund at tolerable interest rates. It has opened up the possibility of sovereign debt defaults, of government bankruptcies replacing private bankruptcies. And since Keynesian solutions are subordinated to the logic of capitalism, it has no answer for capital markets that refuse to fund its debt programs, which demand austerity measures with the threat of deeper crisis.
Capitalist economists generally contend that government deficit spending should normally not exceed the long term nominal growth rate of 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product and that the government’s accumulated debt should be under 60 per cent of GDP to ensure the ability of government revenues to service debt – particularly if interest rates rise. If debt mounts beyond these levels, states’ credit ratings and ability to borrow may start to decline. Private capital then refuses to continue to fund the debt at acceptable levels, pushing up interest rates, which both slows the economy and takes an even bigger chunk of state revenues for debt payments.
Once government debt rises above 100 per cent of GDP, servicing the debt, particularly as interest rates rise, can become so onerous in relation to state revenue that governments have historically tried to escape debt burdens by devaluing their currencies, attempting to inflate their way out of debt, or defaulting on the debt, forcing creditors to accept only partial paybacks.
Virtually every advanced industrial country tried to stem the destruction brought on by capitalist crisis by raising deficit spending in the last year to 6-10 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. The worst-case scenarios are Greece, Britain, and Ireland, which are running government budget deficits of 12-13 per cent, followed by Spain and United States, with deficits of 11 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. These are figures that have only been exceeded during the two world wars.
The ongoing debt crisis
The debt bubble which triggered the crisis has not been solved. It has merely been transferred from private hands to the state: from the banks, mortgage companies, auto industry, AIG, etc., to the public. The state nationalised private capitalist debt at such unprecedented amounts that it threatens the state’s ability to fund that debt in the face of ongoing additions to national debt by the budgetary deficits.
One index of the long-term nature of this crisis is that the US government projects it will be running a deficit of a trillion dollars a year for the next decade. To make up for the decline in private demand, it projects a long-term crisis that is building up its debt.
Sovereign debt default – the possibility of states refusing to pay their debt – has emerged as a key contradiction of this crisis. The Greek crisis is the template for the emerging multi-year, and multi-country sovereign debt crisis. The level of Greece’s deficit and debt is making it difficult to finance that debt in the capital markets. Greek government bond ratings have declined to just above junk bond status. If they were to fall further it will be impossible for them to be used as collateral in inter-bank and money market transactions, effectively shutting down the Greek banks.
The bond market and the European Union countries, which share a common currency with Greece, forced it to introduce austerity measures. Taxes on working class and popular consumption were raised; the value-added tax went from 19 per cent to 21 per cent. Government salaries, pensions, and benefits were cut. Demand – consumption – is being cut.
This is just the first instalment to bring down the deficit from 12.5 per cent to 9 per cent. Next year there will be another instalment to bring it down to 6 per cent, and a year after, still more. What is being introduced is what used to be the IMF austerity program – through the medium of the capital markets and the insistence of the German government. Greece will be in an intolerably deep slump for years.
These measures are not enough to prevent the capital markets from demanding ruinous interest rates on Greek government debt, exacerbating the downturn – but they make perfect sense for the hedge funds, banks, and corporations all speculating on Greek debt for their pound of flesh.
One of the lessons of the 1930s was not to cut demand, which only deepened and prolonged the bust. Keynes’s solution was that the state should make up for the fall in demand in the private economy by stimulating demand through state deficit spending.
That was last year’s solution, when finance capital had to be rescued. Once rescued, finance capital now demands that the government deficit and debt be cut or it will not finance it. Cut the deficit, cut demand, is the new political chorus. Yet there is also the fear that if this is done too soon the recovery will collapse. And if the sovereign debt crisis spreads to other parts of Europe as well – to Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, etc. – it threatens another, deeper, European-wide and international crisis.
We are now very quickly approaching the 1937 dilemma, when the Roosevelt administration cut back deficit spending and cheap credit, and set off a second severe depression. That was four years into the Roosevelt administration. This very rapid stimulus, and much greater deficits than the 1930s, sped up recovery and also sped up deficit and debt problems that threaten the possibility of a new downturn.
Fallout
What is in store for the future? One possibility is years of instability, of incoherent policy, of stops and goes, alternating between deficit reduction programs, new downturns, followed by new stimulus programs. There is a good possibility that further instability in the next few years will come from countries with enormous debt engaging in currency devaluations, or raising inflation to wipe out debt. The biggest fear is the impact that sovereign debt defaults may have on the financial system, with the possibility of new banking crises.
Also unknown is what the fallout of this will be on the European Union. Will the common market with common currency and monetary policy survive without a common fiscal policy and government? The contradictions of imperialism – between a globalised economy on the one hand and nation-states on the other, of anarchy of production on a world scale with no single power capable of regulating it – emerge with full force in this crisis. The United States is no longer the only economic superpower, no longer able to play the role in the world economy that it did in the last 65 years, when it was hegemonic enough to impose its economic policies on the other capitalist states.
The change in the objective conditions, in the nature of the period, after the normal lags of consciousness, eventually have their impact on politics. In periods of economic instability, of corroded economic fundamentals, it leads to political instability and to sharp, sudden turns in popular political opinion.
The main problem of the Obama administration isn’t solely what the left views as its failure – that it hasn’t produced change – but what capital views as its failure: that it hasn’t produced a way out of this crisis despite stabilising the situation.
Keynesian economics, capitalist state intervention, does not yet provide a way out of the capitalist crisis. This is not just Obama’s problem. This is also the problem of Papandreou and his Socialist Party that is now carrying out austerity in Greece. This used to be referred to in the socialist movement by the metaphor of squeezed lemons. The capitalists squeeze the liberals and social democrats to get popular acquiescence in accepting cuts. When they have exhausted their possibilities, they are then discarded for right-wingers who will make even further cuts. This is the dead end of capitalist politics in a crisis.
A year after the hope in Obama dissipated as people’s living standards fell, the alternative being popularised by the media is that of the Tea Partiers with their demand for “small government and cutting the deficit.” They are useful idiots. Small government is not an attack on the banks, as some of the tea-baggers imagine, but an attack on government spending on entitlements and social programs. Capitalism’s love story is to solve this crisis by cutting the standard of living of the working class. On this, there is general agreement in both capitalist parties – the question is over the details, and how to sell it.
The long-term solution the US government is seeking is similar to what is unfolding in Greece – austerity. The big-ticket items to cut in the government budget will be jobs, pensions, and benefits, with the age of eligibility for Social Security raised to 70 years, Medicare to 67, and Medicaid cut. Taxes are to be shifted even more onto the working class, through taxes on gasoline (packaged as “green” or “for energy independence”) to a value-added tax. Ordinary consumers will be taxed rather than businesses (packaged as necessary for exports in international competition).
Obama’s budget for 2011 calls for a freeze on discretionary spending while leaving military spending untouched, and he supports the formation of a bipartisan commission to consider ways to cut spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.
We have already seen this move toward deep austerity play itself out in the state and municipal budget cuts in the United States, which have led to drastic layoffs and social service cuts – cuts that would be far worse if it weren’t for the $150 billion states received from the federal stimulus plan. Once the stimulus money runs out, the cuts will run even deeper.
There is great anger that banks have been bailed out at the expense of the majority, but working-class organisation is still extraordinarily weak. People are open to many different solutions, including right-wing populism, scapegoating immigrants, etc. But revolutionary Marxist politics today are also more relevant than they have been at any point in the last half-century. The situation demands greater ideological sophistication of Marxists. We must expose neoliberalism and the right, but we must also explain the limits of Keynesianism, why both political parties are parties of the ruling class, and expose their plans to restore profitability on the backs of the working class.
There is no crystal ball to show us how the crisis, or politics, will unfold. It is almost unbelievable that within a year of massive stimulus, there would now be proposals for austerity. We know with the budget cuts, there is sentiment to fight back, but it has to be organised. The movement is still politically and organisationally in its infancy.
We don’t know where in the world the upsurge in class struggle is going to start, or have its first successes. The fightback against this austerity is at its beginning. Yet in this long-term crisis there are the openings to begin the process of recreating a working-class movement based on a program of class struggle and socialism.

This article was first published in the International Socialist Review, Issue 71, May-June 2010 (www.isreview.org).
http://sa.org.au/economy/2741-the-contradictions-of-the-recovery